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ABSTRACT 
It is essential to know the source IP address of a packet to prevent the IP spoofing 
attack which masquerades the sender's true identity. If there is a way to trace back the 
origin of the massive DDoS attacks, we could find the responsible parties of the incidents 
and prevent future attacks by blocking them. Unfortunately, the original TCP/IP stacks 
don't require the real source IP address to forward the packets to the destination. 
Malicious attackers can modify the source IP address to hide its true identity and able to 
send the fraudulent packets to the victim. 
One of the critical features of the next generation Internet is having a secure 
Internet which provides trust between participants and protects the privacy of the 
individuals. In this paper, we review the various approach to provide the source address 
validation (SAV) schemes. There are many new methods have been proposed, no single 
way is providing the comprehensive solution to this issue. Privacy is a critical issue to 
consider when the true identity is available on the network as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A well-known and frequently-exploited vulnerability in version 4 of the network layer 
Internet Protocol consists of an attacking host fraudulently substituting the 32-bit Source IP 
Address field with the address of a trusted host.  Known as address masquerading or address 
spoofing, an attacking host exploits a pre-existing trust relationship that exists between two hosts 
and impersonates one of the trusted hosts to gain unauthorized access to the other.  Many 
application layer services make authorization decisions based exclusively on the value of a 
source address. In a typical connection-oriented client-server scenario involving a client station 
Alice and a server station Bob, Alice initiates a TCP connection to Bob by first sending a 
synchronization datagram to Bob that contains an initial 32-bit sequence number.  This initial 
synchronization datagram is acknowledged by Bob by sending a synchronization with 
acknowledgment datagram back to Alice with another sequence number chosen by Bob.  Finally, 
a connection is established when Alice sends Bob an acknowledgment datagram that 
acknowledges Bob’s sequence number.  If a prior trust relationship exists between Alice and Bob 
wherein, for example, a user with an account on Alice is permitted to log in to Bob without 
requiring a password remotely. An attacker could fool Bob by constructing a TCP datagram with 
a properly guessed sequence number and the IP address of Alice in the 32-bit Source IP Address 
field shown in Figure 1.  To defend against address masquerading exploits, several techniques 
have been proposed in the literature which aims to confirm the identity of a source address 
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Figure 1. Structure of the IPv4 datagram header. 
within an IP datagram.  Known as 
source address validation (“SAV”), 
these approaches employ mechanisms 
within network devices to authenticate 
the identity of a source address as a 
datagram progresses from an originating local LAN to another destination LAN through 
intermediary switches, gateways, and routers. In this research-in-progress, we review and 
characterize current literature relevant to SAV to lay an initial groundwork for future research, 
which ultimately aims to conceive a scheme to significantly discourage cyber-attacks of various 
types in a non-invasive and cost-effective manner while maintaining the privacy of ordinary 
people. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
One of the original implementations of SAV is the source address validation architecture 
(“SAVA”) proposed and deployed by Wu et al. (Wu et al. 2007) on the China Education and 
Research Network (CERNET).  Part of the China Next Generation Internet (CNGI) effort, 
CERNET supports an experimental all-IPv6 network that researchers can use to deploy and 
evaluate experimental protocols.  SAVA employs three mechanisms to authenticate a source 
address.  First, a source address is authenticated at the local LAN by a subnet gateway that 
contains an internal table which provides a mapping between MAC addresses of devices on the 
subnet and their authorized IP address.  Received packets that contain a mismatch between IP 
source address and Ethernet MAC address are dropped and not forwarded.  Second, a source 
address is authenticated within an autonomous system (AS) by routers that maintain internal 
tables that relate a prefix to an interface on which packets with specified prefixes may only 
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arrive.  Datagrams that arrive on a router interface containing a prefix that is not matched by a 
table entry are dropped and not forwarded.  Third, source addresses are authenticated between 
ASs using an inter-AS address validation scheme that separately handles routing between two 
neighboring SAVA-compliant ASs, two SAVA-compliant ASs separated by one or more non-
compliant ASs, and one compliant and one non-compliant AS.  Six different protocols are 
needed to handle these three cases, making SAVA somewhat involved to deploy.  SAVA is 
designed to operate only with IPv6 and does not support IPv4, because SAVA requires that each 
device have a globally unique IP address and thus IPv4 with network address translation (NAT) 
cannot be supported.  Also, SAVA requires centralized IP address management to be effective, 
and will not cope well in decentralized IT environments, where different, independent groups 
maintain portions of an AS address space.  SAVA also requires network devices maintain tables 
that map IP addresses to devices and routing interfaces, something that can be implemented 
using software defined networking (SDN) where switches and routers can pass datagrams from a 
data plane (DP) to a control plane (CP) where SAVA protocols are implemented in software.  
Nevertheless, SAVA has been successfully implemented, in an incremental fashion, on a CNGI 
IPv6 test-bed connecting 12 universities in China (Bi et al. 2008; Hu and Wu 2012), although 
additional research is needed to evaluate if SAVA can be deployed at the scale of the global 
Internet. 
He et al. (2010) has developed a routing protocol, Minimum Hop to First SAVA (MHFS) 
node that enables incremental deployment of SAVA.  MHFS will guarantee that at least one 
SAVA-compliant device will process the route of datagrams (He et al. 2010).  SAVA was 
designed at Tsinghua University; researchers at Nanchang University have proposed 
improvements to SAVA, Source Address Validation Improvements (SAVI) (Yan et al. 2011), as 
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an IETF working group.  More recently, source address validation in IPv6 networks based on 
SAVI design principles has been investigated by Hu and Wu at South China University of 
Technology in Guangzhou (Hu and Wu 2012) who have successfully implemented SAVI address 
validation and forwarding rules in Ethernet switches. Although SAVA provides the individual 
level traceability for the source identity, it requires additional devices which have a SAVA 
compatible. The costs of implementation and maintenance of such devices are problems to 
deploy the SAVA systems over the multi-AS networks because the implementation costs and 
benefits are not equally shared between the senders and the receivers of the packets. 
We classified the various source address validation schemes as the Table 1. In this table, 
the schemes are classified by the place that they are applied. 
Table 1: Source Address Validation Classification 










Packets are authenticated 
with the unique identifiers 
with or without 
encryption 
Packet information are 
shared. 
Packet are marked for 
additional monitoring. 
Additional devices and 
protocols are applied. 
Passive or active IP 
traceback 








Although SAVA and SAVI have all three levels validation mechanisms, they are mainly 
creating the source address validity at the source host level. The intermediate Routers can 
generate ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) messages to share the hop information, 
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timestamp, and MAC address of each packet and share it with neighbor routers (Bellovin et al. 
2003). BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) messages also can be used at the border gate routers to 
exchange the packet information (Duan et al. 2007; Singh et al. 2016). Using these messages, the 
tracking of the sources is possible. Marking the packet itself is another way to trace back to the 
origin. Using PPM (Probabilistic Packet Marking) and DPM (Deterministic Packet Marking) 
mechanisms, one can mark packets (Bellovin et al. 2003). When routers inspect the incoming 
and outgoing packets regularly for these marks, it is possible to know the source information. 
Routers can hold the IP header information that it transfers in its storage for future references. 
SPIE (Source Path Isolation Engine) uses specific filtering mechanism to keep the data it the 
router's storage (Snoeren et al. 2001). CenterTrack is an approach to provide a special inspection 
when there are flooding attacks in the network (Stone and others 2000). In a normal situation, 
special routers do not intervene, but when there are abnormal traffic attacks, the traffic is 
redirected to specific servers which can inspect the traffic and examine the traceback 
information. This approach can identify the attackers accurately. SDN (Software Defined 
Network) and other intelligent network architectures can provide the source identification 
correctly also (Zhang et al. 2018). 
At the destination host level, traceback approach is common. Use ICMP messages and 
other network administration messages; the destination host can initiate the passive or active 
traceback to the source hosts. When there is no valid response from the hosts with random 
probing, the destination hosts can block the incoming packets from the unresponsive sources (Bi 
et al. 2015; Strayer et al. 2004). Although the traceback could be applied global scale without 
any significant costs, it is a limited and reactive approach, and it could add more stress to the 
destination network devices which are already stressed out. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we briefly reviewed the current source IP address validation efforts. Currently, 
there are practical hurdles of the source address validation. For instance, although ISPs are in an 
excellent position to deter much of the cyber threats and attacks and although ISPs are 
increasingly realizing that their networks are not immune from the cyber threats, their counter 
efforts are hampered by such practical issues as their legal implications and necessary 
infrastructure investment and subsequent transference of the implementation costs to service 
users. As a result, ISPs may lack incentives to implement such scheme as source address 
validation. Nonetheless, we feel that we have reached the tipping point where a fundamental 
solution is necessary to discourage cybercriminals from wreaking havoc on individuals, 
businesses, and governments. 
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